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arfage Rights and the Territorial Extent of Indian Reservation Bordering on Navigable Water - Who Owns t
ACCESS AND WHARFAGE RIGHTS AND THE TERRITORIAL
EXTENT OF INDIAN RESERVATION BORDERING ON
NAVIGABLE WATER-WHO OWNS THE BED
OF FLATHEAD LAKE?
The area around beautiful Flathead Lake in northwestern Montana
is rapidly becoming one of the favorite summer resort and recreation
areas of the entire Rocky Mountain West.' Real property values in the
vicinity of the lake have risen rapidly in recent years with lake shore
property being particularly valuable.2 Because the southern half of the
lake lies within the external boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation3 and because of a 1942 decision from the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Rochester v. Montana Power Co.,4 a unique question exists
as to a possible conflict between the rights of riparian owners5 on the
lake and the tribal rights of the confederated Indian tribes who occupy
the reservation.
ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
Opening of Flathead Reservation to Settlement
The Flathead Indian Reservation was created by the Hell Gate
Treaty with the confederated tribes of the Flathead, Kootenay and
Upper Pend d'Oreilles Indians on July 16, 1855.6 By this treaty the
1

Flathead Lake is the second largest natural fresh water lake west of the Mississippi
River. MONTANA STATE UNIV RsITY, THE MONTANA ALMANAC 355 (1958).
'Shoreline properties on Flathead Lake are currently selling at an average of $50 to
$100 per frontage foot, with some well developed sites being considerably more
expensive. Interview with realtor W. D. (Bill) Lee, in Missoula, Mont., May 11,
1965.
'The area of the Flathead Reservation is described in the Hell Gate Treaty, July 16,
1855,.12 Stat. 976 (Proclaimed April 18, 1859) as follows:
Commencing at the source of the main branch of the Jocko River;

thence

along

the divide separating the waters flowing into the Bitter Root River from those flowing
into the Jocko to a point on Clarke's Fork between the Camash and Horse prairies;
thence northerly to, and along the divide bounding on the west the Flathead River,
to a point due west from the point half way in latitude between the northern and
southern extremities of Flathead Lake; thence on a due east course to the divide whence
the Crow, the Prune, the So-ni-el-em and the Jocko Rivers take their rise, and thence
southerly along said divide to the place of beginning.

The description of the reservation does not specifically refer to the lake, but a
plotting of the boundaries clearly shows the lake to be bisected by the reservation's
northern boundary. Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 190 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1942).
'Ibid.
'By the traditional meaning, "riparian"
ownership refers to ownership of lands
bordering on streams or rivers, whereas ownership of lands bounding on lakes or
ponds is ''littoral" ownership. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 159, 201
Pac. 702, (1921). However, this distinction seems to have fallen into some disuse
and "riparian"
is presently utilized by many courts and writers to describe larid
bordering on both lakes and streams. See GOULD, WATERS § 148 (3d ed. 1900);
1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 62 (1904); and 1 WEIL, WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WESTERN STATES, §§ 726, 728 (3d ed. 1911).
612 Stat. 975 (1859). The treaty did not actually become effective until almost four
years after it was signed. It was ratified by the Senate on March 8, 1859, and
proclaimed by the President on April 18, 1859.
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confederated tribes ceded all "their right, title, and interest in and to
the country occupied or claimed by them" in a large part of the Washington Territory.7 In return for this cession the governmenit reserved
"for the use and occupation of said confederated tribes"" the general
reservation.9
From the time of removal of the tribes to the rescrvation until the
early part of the twentieth century the reservation lands were occupied
exclusively by the confederated tribes.' 0 Then, in 1909, following congressional action, " portions of the reservation were for the first time
opened to non-Indian settlers.' 2 The legislation under which the reservation was opened provided for the survey of all'3 the lands within the
reservation boundaries and for individual allotments to all eligible persons having tribal rights in the confederated tribes. The remaining lands
were to be classified and appraised and opened to settlement by nonIndians.' 4 Subsequent special legislation authorized the Secretary of
the Interior to subdivide into lots of not less than two or more than five
acres and sell all the unallotted lands fronting on the lake. 15 As a
result of this division and opening of the reservation, substantially all
the land of the reservation has come into the hands of individual owners.
7

This area includes substantially all of the state of Montana west of the continental
divide. 12 Stat. 975 (1859).
812 Stat. 975 (1859).
'See note 3 supra for the treaty description of the reservation boundaries. The original reservation was approximately sixty miles long and forty miles wide and contained about 1,425,000 acres. MONT. PRESS BUREAU, supra note 1, at 4.
10Except for employees of the Indian department, white men were forbidden to reside
on the reservation. 12 Stat. 975, 976 (1859).
"Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 302. The land was opened by Presidential Proclamation on May 22, 1909.
"This opening of the reservation lands to individual settlement was a part of the
government's policy, culminating in the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887),
to pursuade the Indian to give up his nomadic way of life and adopt the habits of
civilized life. The General Allotment Act, supra gave the President authority to
order allotment of all reservations in severalty to individual Indians "whenever in
his opinion any reservation or any part thereof is advantageous for agricultural and
grazing purposes. . . ." In essence the allotment system provided for: (1) allotment of tribal lands to individual Indians, normally under trust patents which
restricted the allottees' ability to alienate the property; (2) termination of the
restrictions on alienability after a fixed term of years; (3) termination of the alienability restrictions by administrative action prior to the expiration of the specified
period; and (4) alienation of allotted lands prior to the expiration of the specified
period. DIEP'T. OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
777 (1958). [Hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAw]. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
773-818 for a general survey of the allotment system and its operation. The allotment system is no longer a viable part of American Indian law, having been substantially abolished by the Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. 461 (1958).
"See text infra at 27 for discussion of the significance of all reservation lands being
surveyed.
"The Presidential Proclamation of May 22, 1909, 36 Stat. 2494, provided that ''all
the non-mineral unreserved lands classified as agricultural lands of the first class,
agricultural lands of the second class and grazing lands within the Flathead Indian
Reservation" were to be made available to non-Indian settlers. By the terms of the
Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 302 timber lands had been specifically excepted from
the disposal provisions.
"Act of April 12, 1910, 36 Stat. 296. Under this act timber lands bordering on the
lake were not excepted but were to be sold along with lands of other classifications.
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19.65] and the Territorial Extent of Indian
The Rochester Decision
Montana Power Co. v. Rochester 1 involved the titles to two tracts
of land located within the reservation. One title had been derived from
an individual allotment to an Indian grantee; the other stemmed from
a federal patent issued on a tract of the unallotted lands. Plaintiff,
owner of an island in the lake which had been part of the unallotted
lands, 17 brought an action against the power company for damages
resulting from the flooding of an easement. Plaintiff's island, prior to
the construction of Kerr Dam,'8 had been joined to the shore by a narrow
isthmus, which was above the low water mark of the lake for several
months each year. Plaintiff purchased an easement across this isthmus
from the owner of the shoreline lot upon which it terminated. The
grantor's chain of title commenced with a patent to an Indian allotee.
With the construction of Kerr Dam the normal low water level of the
lake was raised and the isthmus at all times remained under water.
Plaintiff sued because of this flooding. The Ninth Circuit determined
that no easement could have been conveyed to plaintiff since the original
patent of the shoreline lot had granted title only to high water mark.
Title to the bed of the lake within the boundaries of the reservation remained in the United States in trust for the confederated tribes. 19
Thus the Rochester case, by means of a law suit to which neither
20
the confederated tribes nor the riparian owners on the lake were parties,
determined issues materially affecting the rights of both. The balance
of this paper will attempt to analyze two of the important issues raised
by the decision: (1) the propriety of the court's determination that
title to the lake bed below high water mark was held in trust by the
United States for the confederated tribes, and (2) the effect of the
21
decision upon access and wharfage rights of the riparian owners.
22
TITLE TO BEDS OF NAVIGABLE LAKES

English Common Law
The English common law rules governing title to navigable waters
"8Supra note 3.
"The plaintiff held title by direct patent from the federal government. Id. at 190.
'This dam had been constructed at the outlet to Flathead Lake under a license issued
by the Federal Power Commission. It was completed in 1938. Id. at 189.
"Although title to the shoreline lot involved in the litigation had been derived from
an Indian allottee the language of the court seems clear that the rule would apply
equally to unallotted lands sold to non-Indian grantees. See Id. at 193.
'The plaintiff was the riparian owner of the island, but the rule of the case is stated
in terms of the mainland property.
'Only the riparian rights of access and wharfage will be discussed in this paper.
No attempt will be made to determine what effect, if any, the Rochester decision
may have had on other. riparian rights. See text infra at note 107 for discussion of
access and wharfage rights.
'For purposes of this study the statement of the Ninth Circuit in Bochester that
Flathead Lake is a navigable body of water will be accepted. The court cited no
authority in support of this position but it was undoubtedly correct. See United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
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23
and their beds had their beginnings in the Roman law. By the seventeenth century it was fairly well established that the Crown held full
proprietary rights and interests in the navigable waters of England
and the colonies to a distance of three miles from the shoreline. These
rights held by the Crown were of a dual nature. They consisted of the
jus publicum or "the right of jurisdiction and control [of the waters]
for the benefit of [the King's] subjects, ' 24 and the jus privatum or the
25
The jus privatum was
proprietary right to the bed of the waterway.
so conveyed remained
land
any
but
the
King,
by
subject to conveyance
could not convey th
King
the
since
subject to the2e rights of the public
jus publicum.

American law
The concept of the King's dual interests in navigable waters was
the accepted rule in the American colonies at the time of the revolution. 27 With the Declaration of Independence and the dissolution of
ties with England the people of the individual colonies assumed the
role of the sovereign and held absolute title and control of the navigable waters within their boundaries. The subsequent formation of the
federal union and ratification of the Constitution by the individual
states did not effect a grant of the lands beneath navigable waters to
the central government. 28 Instead, each state continued to hold 29title
Of
subject to the paramount right of Congress to regulate commerce.
course the United States maintained complete control over the territorial lands held by the central government. The submerged lands below
navigable waters within the territories were deemed to be held in trust
for future states. As new states were carved from the territories and
admitted into the union they acquired the same rights of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the submerged lands as had been exercised by the
original thirteen states.30
23See GOULD, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 1-29 and 1 FARNHAM, Op. cit. supra note 5,
§§ 36-40 for excellent background material on development of the English position.
2GouLD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 17.
5Ibid. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1894).
"Under the English common law the only rights held in trust for the public under the
jus publicum were navigation and fishery. 1 FARNHAM, op. cit. supra note 5, § 36.
GOULD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 17.
2'Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212 (1845). Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 14.
2Martin v. Waddell, supra note 27, at 410; Pollard v. Hagan, supra note 27, at 229;
Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 15-16.
21The Supreme Court has adopted a different rule for submerged lands below nonnavigable waters. Title to the beds of non-navigable waters did not pass to the
state upon its entry into the union. Rather, this land remained a part of the public
domain with title in the United States in its proprietary capacity. United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931), United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). In
the capacity of a private owner the United States is subject to the general law of
the state, so far as its conveyances are concerned, and if, under state law, riparian
owners held to the thread of the stream, a grant from the United States of lands
bounding on the stream would carry with it title to the center. See Hardin v. Jordan,
140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891) and Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903).
'*Pollard v. Hagan, supra note 27, at 230. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 26.
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The title which the states acquired in the submerged lands below
navigable waters is subject to one other important limitation in addition to the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Although supported largely by dictum, it has been accepted by the Supreme Court that:
"The United States while they hold the country as a territory, having
all the powers both of national and of municipal government, may grant,
for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in the soils below highwater
mark of [navigable] waters."3' Congress has never adopted this approach
as a general policy and only in instances where there is shown to be some
international duty or public exigency in making such a grant will the
3 2
doctrine be invoked.
Thus, as a general rule once a state is admitted to the union the
federal government holds no interest in the submerged lands beneath
navigable waters of the state beyond the limitations of regulation of
commerce and the doctrine of prior grants. A riparian grantee acquiring title from the United States would therefore secure, by virtue of
such grant, no title below high water mark.33 This however, does not
fully answer the question of what is the nature of the states' interests.
Nor does it determine what interest, if any, passes from the state to
the riparian grantee of lands adjacent to navigable waters.
It is well settled that whatever interests the riparian owner possesses
in submerged lands below highwater mark is solely a question of local
law of the state in which the land is located.3 4 Moreover, because of
a basic misinterpretation of the common law principles governing the
Crown's interests in navigable waters of the colonies prior to the revolution,35 laid down in the early Supreme Court case of Martin v. Waddell,36 a conflict of authority has developed among the states on the
nature of the states' interests in their navigable waters.
In the Waddell case the Court speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Taney, failed to distinguish between the Crown's right of title in the
soils under water, the jus privatum, and the rights of the public, the jus
publicum. In so doing, the Court adopted a position that the only
interest involved in a grant of fishing rights from the King, in navigable
tide waters of what is now the state of New Jersey, was the jus publicum.
The Court went on to state that title to the soil remained in "the king
in his public and regal character as the representative of the nation
and in trust for them. 3 7 This statement of the Court was clearly er3'Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 58. See also Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471 (1850).
"Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 58; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 55 (1926). Research indicates that the Supreme Court has never passed on the
question of what ''international duties or public exigencies" would be sufficient to
prevent title from passing to the new state. The absence of cases applying the
doctrine would indicate that no grant by implication would be relied upon to bring
about its invocation.
'Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 58.
$'Ibid.
'See text supra at note 23 for discussion of this point.
"fMartin v. Waddell, supra note 27.
"Id. at 409.
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roneous since it was the accepted common law rule that the Crown did
have the power to alienate lands below navigable waters subject to the
rights of the public.38
As a result of the confusion created by the Waddell case some states
have developed what is known as the "trust" doctrine governing title
to lands below navigable waters. These states hold that the state
cannot alienate the submerged lands, but must hold title in trust for
the interests of the public. The riparian owner can take no title to the
soil below high water mark.3 9 Other states, on the theory that since
the state is proprietor of the lands within its boundaries, follow the
common law rule that the state has the power to grant submerged lands
40
to private owners.
Montana, by both statute4' and case law 42 has accepted the view
that the owner of lands bordering on navigable waters takes title to
low water mark. Thus, the riparian owners on Flathead Lake now
hold title to low water mark if the submerged lands ever became
vested in the state in its proprietary capacity. Any acquisition of
title by the state would depend upon whether title to the land in
question had ever passed to the confederated tribes, and if it had so
passed whether at some later date the United States in its capacity
as trustee for the tribes extinguished that title.
INTERESTS OF THE INDIANS IN FLATHEAD LAKE BEDS
As previously noted, the Rochester decision ruled that state law was
not applicable to the lands below high water mark. Since the south
half of Flathead Lake was within the boundaries of the reservation,
the Ninth Circuit determined that there could be no question of the
government's intent to hold the submerged lands of the lake, as well as
uplands, in trust for the tribes. The court reasoned that because
the United States had held title to the submerged lands as trustee
for the Indians at the time Montana entered the union, Montana gained
no title at that time. Furthermore, the court ruled that there had been
no subsequent relinquishment of the United States' trust title after
Montana gained statehood.
The circuit court relied upon two principal factors in determining
81 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 325 (2d ed. 1912).
"See e.g., Gasman v. Wilcox, 54 Idaho 700, 35 P.2d 265; Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr.
Co., 238 N.W. 416, 89 A.L.R. 1132 (Iowa 1931); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181,
53 N.W. 1139 (1893); Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, f25 Pa. 605, 74 Atl. 648
(1909).
4°See e.g., Rome Ry. & Light Co. v. Loeb, 141 Ga. 202, 80 S.E. 785 (1914); City of
Covington v. State Tax Comm'n, 231 Ky. 606, 21 S.W.2d 1010 (1929); Kinkead v.
Turgeon, 74 Neb. 580, 109 N.W. 744 (1906).
1

1 REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,

1947, § 67-712 provides:

Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent,

the owner of the land, when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to
the edge of the lake or stream at low-water mark; when it borders upon any
other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream.
(Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)

'1Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 88 Mont. 250, 258, 266 Pac. 646 (1928).
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that title to the submerged lands remained in the Indians after the
division and allotment of the reservation. One of these factors was
Montana's enabling act which specifically provided that title to Indian
lands within the state was to remain in the United States and under
its exclusive jurisdiction and control until extinguished by the government. 43 The other factor was the absence of any extinguishment of the
United States' beneficial ownership. 44 In view of the government's
agreement under the treaty to hold the land in trust, the court ruled
it would be "inadmissible to suppose" that the United States ever:
intended to put the tribes at the mercy of the future state, the
policy of which was unknown at the time of the treaty.... [or] at the
time of the passage of the General Allotment Act; for by adoption
of a proprietary policy the state might substantially interfere with,
if not foreclose, use of
the shores by the Indians in the conduct
rights.45

of their fishing

Lake Bed Was Not Part of Reservation
Although there can be no question of the right, until relinquished,
of the United States to exercise exclusive control over any "Indian
Lands" within Montana, a serious question remains as to whether the
Rochester case ought -to be accepted as stating the correct rule governing title to the lands beneath the waters of Flathead Lake. It is submitted that the Rochester decision was erroneous. The riparian owners
on the lake should be deemed to hold title to low water mark in accordance with the accepted law of Montana.
A basic assumption in the Rochester case was that because the north
boundary line of the reservation bisected the lake, the land under the
south half, as well as the waters thereof were held by the United States
for the "use and occupancy" of the tribes and were thus a part of
the reservation. The validity of this assumption must, to a considerable
extent, rest upon the correctness of the court's interpretation of the
Hell Gate Treaty.
Indian treaties are said to be a "closed account in the Constitutional
Law ledger. ' 46 The policy of treaty making as a method of regulation
of Indian affairs was ended by act of Congress in 1871, 4 but prior to
that date a substantial number of treaties had been negotiated out of
which has grown the body of law governing treaty interpretation. The
Hell Gate Treaty is but one example of the continuing importance of
this body of law, since the same act which extinguished the treaty making
policy also provided for a policy of non-interference with existing ob48
ligations under previously ratified treaties.
"Rochester v. Montana Power Co., supra note 3, at 192.

The Montana Enabling Act

(Act of Feb. 22, 1899) § 4, 25 Stat. 676.
"Rochester v. Montana Power Co., supra note 3, at 192.
"Ibid.
"FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 138.
"Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544.
'Iwbid.
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The basic question which must be answered in interpreting any
Indian treaty is: What was the intention of the treaty makers? 9 It
is accepted that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians,5
but it is equally well established that the tenor and terms of the instrument must control, nothwithstanding that this may result in injustices
to either party.51 Moreover, treaties are often in effect for long periods
of time before any judicial interpretation of interests thereunder is made,
and any after the fact determination of what was intended at the time
of signing will necessarily be influenced by subsequent events.
The cases dealing with determination of Indian title in submerged
lands have been limited largely to the lower federal courts. These cases
have considered boundary question regarding many types of reservations
on both non-navigable and navigable waters.52 A wide variety of results
have been reached on the issue of what title, if any, the tribe or tribes
involved held in the submerged lands in question. These decisions are
valuable in analyzing the problem now under consideration. A comparison of the facts of these cases with those of the Flathead Reservation
situation reveals one important factor: a supportable conclusion that
the United States undertook to hold the south half of the bed of Flathead Lake in trust for the confederated tribes cannot rest solely upon
the description of the reservation found in the treaty.5" In every decision dealing with boundaries on navigable waters the courts relied
to some degree upon a peculiar interest of the Indians in the submerged
lands in finding that the lands were a part of the reservation.5 4 In no
case did the court find the submerged lands to be a part of the reservation in the absence of some type of special or specifically stated interest
in the land.
Only two cases have reached the Supreme Court on the specific
issue of Indian interests in submerged lands of navigable waters. 55 In one
"United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 227 U.S. 355, 362 (1913).
5
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
5
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945).
'United States v. Romaine, 255 Fed. 253 (9th Cir. 1919) (navigable river); Taylor
v. United States, 44 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1930) (navigable river); United States v.
Boynton, 53 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1931) (navigable tidelands); United States v.
Elliott, 131 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1942) (non-navigable river); United States v.
Champlin Ref. Co., 156 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1946) (non-navigable river); Moore v.
United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946) (navigable river); Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. Seay, 235 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1956) (non-navigable river); United
States v. Ashton, 170 Fed. 509, (W.D. Wash. 1909) (navigable tidleands); United
States v. Hutchings, 252 Fed. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1918) (non-navigable river); United
States v. Stotts, 49 F.2d 619 (W.D. Wash. 1930) (navigable tidelands); United
States v. Ladley, 4 F.Supp. 580 (D. Idaho 1933) (non-navigable lake).
MSupra note 3.
5

See United States v. Romaine, supra note 52 (Coastal Indians-land used for fishing
and digging shellfish); United States v. Boynton, supra note 52 (reservation boundaries specifically extended to low water line); Moore v. United States, supra note 52
(Indians used lands in connection with established industries of fishing, fur seal
hunting and whaling); United States v. Stotts, supra note 52 (reservation boundaries
specifically extended to low water line).
"United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 32; Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 298 U.S. 78 (1918).
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1965]
of these cases the Court utilized the same "special interest" approach
taken by the lower federal courts in ruling the submerged lands were
within the reservation.56 It relied heavily upon the fact that the
submerged lands were part of fishing grounds which were essential to
the Indians' livelihood.
In addition to the necessity of finding some special interest of
the Indians to be protected, another related obstacle must be overcome
before any grant of lands under navigable waters can be found. This
is the presumption that all submerged lands of this type within a territory are held in trust by the government for future states to be carved
from the territory. 5 As previously noted, a prior grant will not be
presumed, but will be found only where "international duties or public
exigencies" so demand.
Did an "international duty or public exigency" exist under the
terms of the Hell Gate Treaty? An examination of the obligations
created and the rights secured in the treaty, especially when considered
in light of the nature of the tribes' habits at the time of signing, indicates that it did not.
The Hell Gate Treaty contains only two provisions which relate
to submerged lands. The first of these reserves to the Indians the
"use and occupancy" of the described "tract of land" as a general
reservation."6 The other provision reserves to the Indians "the exclusive
right of taking fish in all streams running through or bordering on
[the] reservation. . . [and] the right of taking fish at all usual and ac'59
customed places in common with citizens of the territory.
It has already been noted that the "reserving" of a "tract of land"
alone would not justify the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the south
half of the lake's bed was a part of the reservation.6" Therefore, any
justification for invocation of the "international duty or public exigencies" doctrine enunciated in Shivley v. Bowlby, 61 must come from the
treaty's reservation of fishing rights. The language utilized to describe
these rights is very similar to that found in other treaties6 2 and its
meaning has previously undergone judicial construction.
rUnited States v. Alask~a Pacific Fisheries, supra note

55.

'Supra note 30.
m12 Stat. 975-76 (1859). A subsequent paragraph of the treaty states that the Tribes
were to have the ''exclusive use and benefit'' of the tract. But, the extent of this
"9exclusive use and benefit" is further indicated by other language in the paragraph
prohibiting white men from living on the reservation. Thus, it would seem that
"exclusive"
as used here referred to the quality rather than the quantity of the
Tribes ' interests.
-12 Stat. 976 (1859).
"'Text
supra at note 54.
61
Supra note 25.
"Compare Treaty With Dwamish, Suquamish, and other allied and subordinate Tribes
of Indians in Washington Territory, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (Proclaimed April
11, 1859); Treaty With S'Klallams Indians, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (Proclaimed
April 29, 1859); Treaty With Makah Tribe of Indians, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939
(Proclaimed April 18, 1859); Treaty With Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla
Tribes and Bands of Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945 (Proclaimed April 11,
1859); Treaty With Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (Proclaimed April 18, 1859); Treaty With Nez Perce Indians, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat.
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The treaty recognized two different fishing rights. One right
was that "of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common
with the citizens of the territory. '83 In the United States Supreme
Court case of United States v. Winans64 an identical clause was interpreted. 65 The Court held that the clause applied to lands outside the
reservation and a servitude for this purpose was imposed on all lands
ceded by the Indians under the terms of the treaty. This servitude or
easement continued against the United States and its grantees26 This
right is not a right exercisable on reservation lands and therefore it
cannot properly be relied upon as a basis for concluding the bed of
the lake was a part of the Flathead reservation.
The second fishing right guaranteed by the treaty was the "exclusive right of taking fish in all streams running through or bordering
on the reservation. 0' 7 This right has been interpreted as prohibiting
any regulation thereof by the state, but in a factual setting very similar
to the one presented by the Hell Gate Treaty the Department of the
Interior, relying upon the language of the Winans case, 68 ruled that the
exercise of this right was not dependent upon the ownership of the
bed of the lake and was thus unaffected by the state's ownership of
the bed.69 There was therefore no necessity for the United States to
undertake to hold title to the soil to insure protection of the right.
This right, like the other reserved in the treaty, is in the nature of an
easement or servitude. Its protection for the Indians does not require
and should not support an exception to the general rule that the title
to the bed of the lake was held in trust for the future state to be
formed from the territory.
Two other matters should be noted in connection with the "exclusive"
fishing right guaranteed by the treaty. Both minimize the value of
looking to this guarantee as a basis for finding that the Indians held
title to the lake bed under the terms of the treaty.
First, it is doubtful that the right was even intended to extend to
the lake itself. By its own description the exclusive feature was limited
to streams "running through or bordering on the reservation. ' 70 The
south half of the lake did lie within the boundaries of the reservation
and had the treaty makers intended this feature to apply to the southern
957 (Proclaimed April 29, 1859); Treaty With confederated tribes and bands of
Indians in Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963 (Proclaimed April 18, 1859);
Treaty With Qui-nai-elt and Quil-leh-ute Indians, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971 (Proclaimed April 11, 1859) with Hell Gate Treaty, July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975 (Proclaimed April 18, 1859).
612 Stat. 976 (1859).
"Supra note 49.
'See Treaty With Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 953 (1859).
"Supra note 49, at 381-82.
1712 Stat. 976 (1859).
8Supra note 49.
69FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 497-98 (Quoting from Op. Acting
Sol. M. 28017, June 30, 1936).
712 Stat. 976 (1859).
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portion of the lake it would have been a simple matter to have so
stated. Any construction which defines the word streams to include
a lake is overly strained. It would also seem unrealistic to believe that
the government intended the Indians to exercise exclusive control over
half of the lake while the other half was open to the public.
Second, language identical to that utilized to describe the "exclusive"
right in the Hell Gate Treaty can be found in four other treaties with
Northwest Indians negotiated by Issac I. Stevens, Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory of Washington in 1855.71
Some of the tribes involved were coastal Indians for whom protection
of fishing rights was vitally important for their livelihood, whereas
others like the Flathead, Kootenay and Upper Pend d'Oreilles were
native to the Rocky Mountain area and were much less dependent upon
fishing.7 2 The inclusion of this particular fishing right thus may have
73
resulted from the utilization of an established format for the treaty,
throwing little light on the actual intent of the treaty makers.
The most authoritative decision which can be looked to in answering
the question of ownership of the submerged lands of Flathead Lake
is the Supreme Court case of Holt State Bank v. United States.7 4 This
decision was handed down some fifteen years before the Rochester case
but it was neither cited in the briefs of counsel nor mentioned in the
Rochester opinion.7 5 Of the two cases reaching the Supreme Court on
the question of Indian ownership of lands below navigable waters,
Holt State Bank is the only decision which deals specifically with the
issue of title to beds of navigable lakes.
The Holt State Bank case arose out of an attempt on the part of
the United States to dispose of the lands which made up the bed of
a drained lake.7 6 The lake lay wholly within the confines of the Red
Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota, and had been drained some
years after the shoreline properties had been disposed of pursuant to
act of Congress. Under this act the Indians had formally ceded the
reservation lands to the United States in order that the lands might be
disposed of for the Indians' benefit.77 This case is particularly important
to a determination of the problems raised by the Rochester decision due
to the remarkable similarity in the facts of the two cases. The case
"Treaty With Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands of Indians,
June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 946 (1859); Treaty With Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 953 (1859); Treaty With Nez Perce Indians, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat.
958

(1859);

Treaty With

confederated

tribes and

bands

of Indians

in

Middle

Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 964 (1859).
7TURNEY-HIGH, THE FLATHEAD INDIANS OF MONTANA 123-26 (1937);
UNIVERSITY, THE MONTANA ALMANAC 110-12 (1959).

MONTANA STATE

7SAll of the treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens between January and July, 1855,
with Washington

Territory Indians

are markedly similar

in

format

and content.

This is especially true of the treaties with the Walla-Wallas, the Yakamas, and the
Nez Perce.
1'270 U.S. 49 (1926).
'See

Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee, Rochester

127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
7Act of May 20, 1908, 35 Stat. 169.
'Act of Jan.
14, 1889, 25 Stat.
642.
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directly considers the problem of Indian ownership and protection of
Indian rights in light of the government's established policy of holding
beds of navigable waters in trust for future states.
In both cases the United States had negotiated treaties with Indian
tribes-the Chippewas in Holt78 and the Confederated tribes in Rochester.
In each case the treaty involved was negotiated prior to statehood of
the state in which the reservation was situated, 79 and subsequently the
lands of both reservations were divided and conveyed by government
patent to individual land owners.80
The government in Holt State Bank did not claim an affirmative
disposal of the drained lands. It sought to rely upon the fact that the
lake was within the reservation at the time Minnesota was admitted
into the union. The Court did not find it necessary to comment upon
whether this factor, if unopposed, would have been construed as a
grant to the Indians. Rather it looked to certain aspects of the treaty
with the Chippewas and other existing circumstances which led it to
conclude that title had remained in trust for the future state. The
treaty under which the Indians had claimed title did not formally set
apart the lands which were not ceded to the United States; it did
not contain any affirmative declaration of rights of the Indians; nor
did it attempt to exclude non-Indians from the use of navigable waters
within the reservation. Although the Indians were to have access to
the navigable waters and were entitled to use them in accustomed ways,
the Court ruled there was nothing that approached a grant to the
Indians of lands under navigable waters. 81
There are, of course, some differences between the factual setting
and the treaty involved in the Flathead Lake situation, and that found in
Holt State Bank. An argument may be made that the two cases are
sufficiently distinguishable to prevent application of the Holt State Bank
rationale. Such an argument might run as follows: (1) In Holt State
Bank the treaty under which the Chippewas occupied the reservation
did not contain a formal setting apart of what was not ceded, whereas
the Hell Gate Treaty defined the boundaries of reservation; (2) the
Holt State Bank treaty did not contain an affirmative declaration of
rights, but the tribes under the Hell Gate Treaty were guaranteed the
right to the use and occupancy of the lands as well as hunting and
fishing rights; (3) there was a grant of exclusive occupancy in the Hell
Gate Treaty but none in the Holt State Bank case. Thus, under the Hell
"United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 74, at 58.
"Minnesota did not become a state until almost four years following negotiation of
the treaty, and Montana not until some forty-four years after the signing of the
Hell Gate Treaty.
10In the Holt case the Chippewas had formally ceded the reservation lands to the
United States for disposal for the Tribes' benefit. United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra note 74, at 52; Act of Jan. 14, 1889, 25 Stat. 642. No such formal cession
occurred in Bochester. In the latter case the United States acted under the terms
of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) which made formal cession
unnecessary.
'United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 74, at 58-9.
'Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389 (1902).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/5
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Gate Treaty, the combination of definite reservation, guaranteed rights
of occupancy and use, guaranteeing hunting and fishing rights, together with the "exclusive" feature of the occupancy should imply a
grant of the land making up the bed of the lake. Notwithstanding the
seeming plausibility of this argument, the rationale of the Holt State Bank
case should nevertheless control the question of passage of title to the
Flathead Lake lands.
The fact that the boundaries of the Red Lake Reservation were
not specifically set out in the treaty with the Chippewas did not, in
fact, make the Red Lake Reservation's boundaries less definite. Prior
to the formation of the Red Lake Reservation the Chippewas had negotiated several treaties with the United States. These treaties had
the effect of ceding to the government a large portion of the lands
which the Indians had held in aboriginal possession. The creation of the
reservation, which was on lands that remained a part of the aboriginal
possession after the cessions, was described by the Supreme Court as
follows:
While there was no formal action in respect to the remaining tract,
the effect was to leave the Indians in a distinct tract reserved for
their occupation, and in the same act this tract was spoken of as a
reservation. Now, in order to create a reservation it is not necessary
that there should be a formal cession or a formal act setting aside
a particular tract. It is enough that from what has been done there
results a certain defined tract appropriated to certain purposes.
Here the Indian occupation was confined by the treaty to a certain
83
specified tract. That became, in effect, an Indian reservation.
Thus each case contains the parallel of a reservation of a specific tract
of land containing navigable waters. This should negate any grant
of the bed being implied from, or any significance being attached to,
the physical fact that Flathead Lake lay within the exterior boundaries
of the Flathead Reservation. This is particularly true since the whole of
Mud Lake lay within the Red Lake Reservation and only one-half of
Flathead Lake is within the Flathead Reservation.
The additional factors of specifically reserved hunting and fishing
rights in the Hell Gate Treaty did not make the nature of the confederated tribes' occupancy of the Flathead Reservation significantlydifferent from that of the Chippewas in Holt State Bank. As previously
noted, the only exclusive rights of fishing given to the tribes was in
the streams running through or bordering on the reservation.8 4 The
other fishing rights secured by the treaty, as well as hunting rights
specifically mentioned, were to be exercised outside the reservation.
The final distinguishing aspect in the Flathead situation-the right
of the confederated tribes to the exclusive use and benefit of the tract
making up the reservation-is likewise insufficient to require a rule
different from that laid down in Holt State Bank. The "tract" referred
to is the "tract of land" set apart for the "use and occupancy" of the
'Id. at 389-90. See also Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 (1896).
"See supra note 74.
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tribe as a reservation. 5 An indication of the meaning of this "exclusive
use and benefit" clause is found in the next sentence of the same paragraph. This next sentence prohibits white men from residing on the
reservation. It appears that in context the clause is referring to lands,
not to navigable waters of the reservation. It would be against the long
established United States policy on navigable waters to believe that the
government intended to turn over exclusive use of one-half of a navigable lake to the Indians and leave the other half open to navigation.8 6
It would be even more unrealistic to believe that the Indians expected
to receive any such exclusive use and control. The confederated tribes
were no doubt entitled to have access to the lake and to use it in their
accustomed ways. Precisely the same type of use was found to exist in
the Chippewas in Holt State Bank.
The conclusion which must be reached from the above analysis is that
by the terms of the Hell Gate Treaty the United States did not undertake
to hold the lands in the south half of Flathead Lake in trust for the
confederated tribes. The submerged lands, by the rule laid down in
Holt State Bank, should have passed to the state of Montana upon its
admission to the union.
Indian Title in Lake Bed was Extinguished
Even if the United States originally undertook to hold the bed of
Flathead Lake in trust for the confederated tribes, a serious question
still exists as to whether the Ninth Circuit in Rochester correctly held
that this trust title had not been extinguished by the government
grants of the shoreline properties.
In the Rochester case plaintiff argued that provisions of the General
Allotment Act which made Indian allottees, upon the expiration of the
trust period subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state, s7
had the effect of making applicable the Montana rule that riparian
owners held to low water mark.88 The court rejected this argument
on the ground that the Montana Enabling Act absolutely exempted from
state control all Indian lands.8 9 The court reasoned that Montana law
could have no effect upon the extent of the Indian allottee's grant
unless the United States' trust title for the Indians had been extinguished.
In finding no extinguishment, the court stated: "So far as we are
1612 Stat. 976 (1859).
16For statements of the principle that all persons are to have the right to access to
and use of navigable waters for commerce and navigation see e.g., St. Paul & P. R.R.
v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1869); Economy Light and Power Co. v.
United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
'General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390 (amended by Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182,
25 U.S.C. 349 (1964)).
8
,Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., supra note 42.
"*The Montana Enabling Act (Act of Feb. 22, 1899) § 4, 25 Stat. 676. Montana has
recognized that whatever rights the state acquired by its enabling act were subordinate to the Indians prior rights of occupancy. State ex rel. Irvine v. District Court,
125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272 (1951).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/5
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advised, the beneficial ownership of the Indians in the bed and shores
of the lake has not been extinguished by the government." 90
The weakness of the Ninth Circuit's analysis on this point is that
it failed to give full consideration to other relevant circumstances. The
United States as trustee for the confederated tribes had plenary power
to manage the tribes' property for their benefit. 91 This plenary power
allowed disposal of tribal lands by the government without reference
to the wishes of the tribes, so long as the government did not violate
its position of trusteeship.9 2 The intent of Congress, subject to this
constitutional limitation, must therefore be looked to in determining
the extent of the interests taken by the individual owners under the
allotment and sale of the Flathead Reservation property.
The Ninth Circuit held that there was "nothing in [the treaty or the
setting] or in subsequent legislation, suggestive of an intent that the
ownership of lands in the Reservation below the line of ordinary high
water was to be at the disposal of the state. 9 3 This sweeping statement
completely ignores several factors connected with the legislation under
which the reservation was allotted and sold. These factors, when taken
together, offer a substantial insight into the intent of Congress.
Under the terms of the legislation opening the reservation to allotment, and subsequently to settlement, Congress did intend to extinguish
any title which the government held in trust for the tribes in the submerged lands. The original act opening the reservation to settlement,
after providing for allotments to eligible individual Indians, provided
that all the lands of the reservation were to be surveyed and, with the
exception of timbered lands, were to be sold for the benefit of the
tribes.9 4 Moreover, the subsequent Act of April 12, 1910," 5 which created
the "Villa Sites" specifically provided that all the unalloted lands fronting on the lake within the confines of the reservation were to be sold
to the highest bidder. Once the "Villa Sites" wer disposed of under the
Act of April 12, 1910, no tribal lands remained fronting on the lake.
Tribal ownership of lands fronting on the lake was extinguished and
replaced by individually held titles in both Indian allottees and nonIndian grantees. 96
With all tribal ownership rights ended in the shoreline properties,
could Congress have intended that trust title to the lake bed was to
9'Rochester v. Montana Power Co., supra note 75, at 192.

OCLone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
Congressional power, although "plenary"
in this area is not absolute. The government's power of disposal over tribal lands is subject to constitutional limitations
and such lands can not be appropriated to United States use or given to others
without just compensation being paid. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1935); Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1937).
O'Rochester v. Montana Power Co., supra note 75, at 192. Only the 'subsequent legislation'' aspect of this quotation will be considered at this point.
"Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 302.
136 Stat. 296 (1910).
"In addition to the reservation of timbered lands, tribal ownership was also maintained
in certain power and reservoir sites under the Act of Mar. 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 795.
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continue? It is submitted that it did not. Support for this position
can be found in four separate criteria: (1) Congressional declarations
and governmental statements relating to the Act of April 12, 1910;
(2) the complete lack of any necessity for any continued holding in
order to insure protection of Indian fishing rights; (3) the established
United States position that the extent of grants of lands bordering on
navigable waters are to be governed by state law; and (4) recognized
public policy against hardship and litigation resulting from the anomolous situation created by the Rochester decision.
The Act of April 12, 1910 was enacted for the specific purpose of
dividing unallotted shoreline properties into small plots to take full
advantage of the land's value as residential property. The purpose of
the legislation is clearly shown in a committee report accompanying
the bill:
The bill in question proposes to survey and subdivide into small
lots for summer residence sites the entire unallotted lands fronting
on Flathead Lake, the proceeds from the sale of these lots to be used
in furthering the reclamation of the allotted Indian lands which is
now being carried on.
The lands fronting on this lake are of little agricultural value,
and it is believed that a large amount of money can be realized from
the sale of the lake frontage; much more than can be realized under
the present status of these lands .... 97
An advertising circular issued by the Department of the Interior in
connection with the sale of the shoreline plots further shows the government's recognition of the unique character of these lands: "The lake is
utilized for bathing, sailing, boating and yachting and several steamboats ply between various towns upon its borders. The shores are well
adapted for boat landings and the erection of wharves."98 These documents indicate that the government intended to sell the shoreline properties complete with all the usual incidents of access, right to build
wharves and docks, etc. Moreover, since the amounts received from
the sales were to be applied for the benefit of the tribes, it is apparent
that the Indians received full compensation for the rights and interests
which passed to the riparian grantees. With all the normal incidents
of riparian ownership resting in the grantees and with the Indians having
received full compensation for their rights the United States would have
no need to continue holding the lands.
Protection of either the "exclusive" fishing rights which the tribes
held in streams of the reservation or those fishing rights which were
to be exercised in common with other citizens of the state did not require that the United States continue to hold the beds in trust for
the tribes after disposal of the shoreline properties. As noted in the
discussion of the interests conveyed under the treaty, these rights are
not dependent upon ownership of the soil upon which they are to
be exercised.99 These interests at most only subjected the affected lands
's. Doe. No. 117, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. (1910).
1U.S. Dep't of Interior, Flathead Lake, Montana (1911).

"See text supra at note 69.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/5
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to a servitude which the owner thereof cannot avoid. 10 The fishing rights
never had their foundation in ownership of the lake beds and they would
not be affected by an extinguishment of the United States' trust title.
The shoreline properties would simply remain subject to an easement
guaranteeing the Indians' fishing rights.
Although the United States may have originally undertaken to
hold the reservation, including the bed of the lake, in trust for the
tribes, it extinguished that trust on the lands which were allotted to
individual Indians 101 or were divided and sold to non-Indian grantees.
After the grants, the United States no longer had any ownership interests in the lake bed to protect. It would be fully in accord with the
long recognized governmental policy of leaving the determination of
interests in lands under navigable waters to the states 10 2 to allow Montana
law to govern the interests which the grantees received in lake bed
03

lands.1

Public policy also demands that a situation which could lead to
litigation and strife not be created. As has been shown, the government
sold the shoreline lands without limitation upon the rights appurtenant
thereto, 10 4 and the tribes were fully compensated for their interests. The
Eighth Circuit in considering the Holt State Bank case before it reached
the Supreme Court, quoted from Mitchell v. Smale :1o
We think it a great hardship, and one not to be endured, for the
government officers to make new surveys and grants of the beds of
such lakes after selling and granting the lands bordering thereon,

or represented so to be. It is nothing more nor less than taking from
the first grantee a most valuable, and often the most valuable, part
of his grant. Plenty of speculators will always be found, as such

property increases in value, to enter it and deprive the proper owner

of its enjoyment; and to place such persons in possession under a
new survey and grant, and put the original grantee of the adjoining property to his action of ejectment and plenary proof of his own
title, is a cause of vexatious litigation which ought not to be created
106
(Emphasis added.)
or sanctioned.

It is submitted that the United States did not intend to create a situation
which would, at a future date, result in lawsuits over the extent of the
riparian owners' rights.
lwUnited States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
ImThe lands allotted to individual Indians in severality were, of course, subject to
governmental control as trustee until expiration of the trust period or until the trust
title was otherwise extinguished. See note 12, supra.
1
0Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 33; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25, at 58.
1°3The policy of allowing interests in submerged lands to be determined according to
state law has been followed frequently in cases dealing with United States grants of
lands on non-navigable waters. See e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 102, at 384;
Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510,
512 (1905). See particularly, Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 595 (1922) holding
the same rule applies when the United States disposes of tribal land of Indians
under its guardianship. At least one court of appeals case can be cited as authority
for the rule that state law governs on navigable as well as non-navigable waters.
United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 156 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1946). The latter
view is also taken in GouLD, WATERS § 203 (3d ed. 1900).
'"The easement allowing the tribes exercise of their fishing rights discussed upra at
note 66 is a possible exception to the unrestricted nature of the grants.
'-140 U.S. 406, 412 (1891).
'OUnited States v. Holt State Bank, 294 Fed. 161, 165 (8th Cir. 1923).
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RIPARIAN RIGHTS OF ACCESS & WHARFAGE
Common Law Background

By common law doctrine riparian lands, because of the advantage
10 7
resulting from their peculiar location, have certain "natural rights.'
As described in an early English case,
fT]he rights of a riparian proprietor.. .exist jure naturae because his
land has, by nature, the advantage of being washed by streams;
and if the facts of nature constitute the foundation of the right,
I am unable to see why the law should not recognize fully the course
of nature. . . .108

Riparian rights are generally not thought of as servitudes upon another's
property' 09 and do not arise by artificial condition resting upon grant
or prescription. No act on the part of the owner is needed for him to
acquire riparian rights as they are part and parcel of the riparian lands
and pass without express grant." 0
Riparian rights are available only to riparian or littoral proprietors,"' that is, proprietors whose lands border upon a natural stream
or lake or through whose land a stream flows. 1

2

If the land is riparian

the owner may exercise his riparian rights regardless of the type of
13
water course involved."
Under the English common law the riparian right of access was
well recognized as a right which could not be cut off, even by the
Crown, without compensation. 1 4 By contrast, the companion right
of wharfage was non-existent. Any structure erected below high water
15
mark without the consent of the Crown was treated as a purpresture. "
Access and Wharfage in United States
Developments in the United States law governing access and wharfage rights have been closely related. The extent of their recognition
" 1

WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
RIPARIAN RIGHTS, § 152 (1887).

STATES,

§ 709

(3d ed. 1911).

POMEROY,

"01Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., 1 App. Cas. 662 (1876).
"0See McCordic and Crosby, The Right of Access and the Right to Wharf out to,
4 HARV L. REV. 14 (1891) for discussion of the proposition that the riparian rights
of access and wharfage do not, strictly speaking, meet this definition since they may
be exercised over lands of another.
"'Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 201 Pac. 702 (1921); Lux v. Haggin, 69
Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886); 1 WEIL, op. cit. supra note 107, § 711.
"'Fee ownership of the land is not required. The one claiming riparian rights need
only have exclusive use and possession of the riparian land. GOULD, op. cit. supra note
103, § 168.
"'Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., supra note 110. One who holds title only to the bed of a
watercourse or body of water is not a riparian proprietor. Lux v. Haggins, supra
note 110; 1 WEIL, op. cit. supra note 107, § 723.
l1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 63 -(1900); 1 WEIL, op. cit. supra note
107, §§ 725-728.

"'GoULD, op. cit. supra note 103, § 65. Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co. supra note 108.
"'McCordic and Crosby, supra note 109; GOULD, Op. cit. supra note 123. A purpresture at common law was "an encroachment on and appropriation of land or waters
which

[were]

ed. 1948).

common or public."

THE SELF PRONOUNCING
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within a particular state is a question of state law," 6 but the several
states have not been uniform in this matter. Both rights have generally
been recognized, but in varying degrees. A few states adopt the English
rule and recognize the right of access but not the right of wharfage;
some states treat both as if they were one right; and still others go so
far as to deny such rights at all. Even those states which allow the
riparian owner to exercise both access and wharfage rights impose
qualifications upon their exercise.1 7
Due to the parallel development of access and wharfage rights
in the United States the two rights have several features in common
relative to their nature and extent. The rights as such exist only in
those submerged lands which do not belong to the riparian owner."18
If the owner of the bank also has title to the bed, either to low water
mark or the thread of the stream, he may make such use of his soil
as he sees fit so long as this use does not interfere with use of the
waters for navigation or other public purposes. 1
Although in such
case he would be exercising property rights analogous to wharfage
and access rights, the two types of interest have different bases. This
is best exemplified by a comparison of the remedies available for violation of the respective rights. If the riparian owner is also the owner
of the bed, the structures he builds thereon are fixtures, and any
interference with them or with his right of access would be in derogation of his possessory interests and actionable in trespass. 20 But,
if he does not own the soil below the water line, interference with access
or wharfage is actionable not for violation of possessory interests, but
for violation of his riparian rights.
In those states where access and wharfage rights are recognized,
these "natural rights" have been called variously easements, licenses,
franchises and grants. Labels are of little value since the rights are
clearly sui generis'21 and, like the English access right, not subject to
destruction without compensation. 22 As stated in an early Supreme
Court case:
This riparian right 12 3 is property, and is valuable, and, though it
must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot
be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired. It is a right
of which, when once vested, the owner can only be deprived in
"oShively v. Bowlby, supra note 25.
"'For a complete discussion of the various positions taken by the states, see GOULD, op.
cit. supra note 103, §§ 149-154, 167-179; and 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 666 (3d.
ed. 1939). Those states which completely deny access and wharfage rights generally
do so on the ''trust'' theory that title to the beds of waters lie in the state and
private owners thus have no right to erect permanent structures thereon. Note,
7 WAYNE L. Rzv. 492 (1961).
naTIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 117, § 666.
"I'1FARNHAM, op. cit. sipra note 113, §§ 75, 114; 2 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 117,
§ 666; MeCordic and Crosby, supra note 109.
'Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont 588, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
1 2 2 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 117, § 666.
'11 FARNHAM, op. cit. supra note 113, § 66.
"Here the Court speaks of access and wharfage as if they were one right.
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accordance with established law; and if necessary
that it be taken
124
for the public good, upon due compensation.
The right of access involves more than simply the right to unobstructed access to the water. The riparian owner may also utilize
the right to beach boats on the shore. He may likewise pass through
shallow water on foot or otherwise to reach his property when it is
12 5
inconvenient to bring his boat to his own land.
The wharfage right has, with few exceptions, been generally accepted as the logical extention of the riparian's right of access. But
as with the right of access and the question of title to lands below
high water mark on navigable waters, the ultimate determination of
the extent of the right is one of state law. The extent of this right
is best described in the oft quoted statement of Mr. Justice Miller in
Yates v. Milwaukee:
[W]hether the title of the owner of such a lot extends beyond the
dry land or not, he is certainly entitled to the rights of a riparian
proprietor whose land is bounded by a navigable stream; and among
those rights are access to the navigable part of the river from the
front of his lot, the right to make a landing, wharf, or pier for his
own use or for the use of the public, subject to such general rules
see proper to impose for the
and regulations as the legislature may 126
protection of the rights of the public.
The right to wharf out is not unlimited and must be exercised so that
it will not interfere with navigation or with other rights of the public.
27
The right may be exercised out from shore to the point of navigability
128
and the wharf or dock must be so
or point of practical navigability,
constructed as to be in front of the owner's own property and not
cut off the right of access of other riparian owners."2
The rules which govern the access and wharfage rights of riparian
owners on Flathead Lake must necessarily be found within the general
doctrines set out above. However, the question of what law should
ultimately be applied is complicated by the seemingly incorrect position taken in the Rochester case. Therefore, in addition to the Montana
view on riparian access and wharfage rights the proprietary policies
of the United States on these rights must be examined.
Montana Law of Access and Wharfage
Like many other western states, Montana has repudiated the
riparian doctrine of water rights in favor of the appropriation theory. 30
However, the language of the case announcing this position pertains
v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1871).
note 117, § 666.
"'Supra note 124, at 504.
'"Brunswick v. Union Depot Street Ry. & Transfer Co., 31 Minn. 197, 17 N.W. 626
'Yates

"'2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra

(1883).

"'Hunt v. Illinois 0. RR., 184 U.S. 77 (1902).
12"1 FARNHAM,
Op. cit. supra note 113,1§ 113.
"'Mettler v. Ames Realty, supra note 11.
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only to the use of water and makes no reference to other riparian
rights. Apart from the use of water, rights of riparian ownership
have been the subject of little litigation in the Montana Supreme
Court. There is no direct holding in Montana on the rights of access
and wharfage, but Montana statutes, 131 as well as the language of the
available cases, show that Montana is in accord with the majority of
American jurisdictions in recognizing both access and wharfage as
rights of the riparian owner.
At an early date the Montana Supreme Court gave support to
the existence of wharfage and access rights in Montana by strongly
favorable dictum in Gibson v. Kelly. 32 The court, after holding that
a riparian owner on a navigable river could maintain an action of
ejectment against one occupying the land between high and low water
marks abutting on the riparian's property, quoted from a Michigan
case:133
[T]he rights of riparian proprietors upon our interior lakes... are
the same as those of proprietors upon navigable streams. They have
the right to construct buildings, wharves, and other improvements in
front of their lands, so long as the public servitude is not thereby
impaired. They are a part of the realty to which they attach, and
pass with it. Certainly, no one can occupy for his individual purposes
the water front of such riparian proprietor .... 134
Another case decided since the appropriation theory was formally
recognized discussed the Gibson decision, 3 5 but neither this case nor
Mettler v. Ames Realty Co. 136 took issue with the favorable recognition
of access and wharfage found in Gibson.
Effect of Rochester Decision on Access and Wharfage Rights
If the basic contentions of this paper are accepted, that either
the beds of Flathead Lake never belonged to the confederated tribes,
or that the United States extinguished any title which it originally
may have undertaken to hold for the tribes, then the rights of the
riparian owners on the lake would be governed by Montana law. By
the terms of Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 67-612 and the
holding of the Gibson decision, the riparian owner takes title to low
water mark. He would therefore have the proprietary right by virtue
of his possessory interests, to wharf out to low water mark. In addition, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 89-601 allows him to
wharf out over land belonging to the state below low water mark
so far as is necessary to safely allow all vessels to land and take on
and discharge passengers and cargo. Thus, in summary it can be
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 67-712, 89-601.
'15 Mont. 417, 39 Pac. 517 (1895).
'Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125, 147 (1862) (Martin, C. J. concurring).
'Gibson v. Kelly, supra note 132, at 423 (39 Pac. at 520).
m
Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 82 Mont. 250, 266 Pac. 646 (1928).
' upra note 110.
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said that the riparian owners on the lake are entitled to the exercise
of full rights of access and wharfage out to the point of navigability.
Notwithstanding the contention that the United States should not
be deemed to hold any interests in the bed of the lake, the fact remains
that the Rochester decision must be presumed to be law, and until such
time as it may be overturned, must control. Under the law of that
case, Montana law can not be looked to for a determination of the
riparians' rights. Rather, a determination must be made of what riparian rights the owners can exercise against the United States in
its capacity as trustee for the confederated tribes.
This question is unique among the wealth of federal precedent
dealing with access and wharfage rights on navigable waters. The
problem seems to be one never directly considered by the courts, and
cases precisely in point are not available. However, analagous situations arising in cases of federally held beds of navigable waters in
the District of Columbia and the Territory of Alaska have been passed
upon by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
In the first of these cases, Potomac Steam Boat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steam Boat Co., 13 7 the Supreme Court considered rights of riparian
owners in the District of Columbia in a controversy involving adverse
claimants to a wharfage right. There the Court said:
[A]mong the rights he [the riparian owner] is entitled to as such,
are "access to the navigable part of the river from the front of his
lot, the right to make a landing, wharf or pier for his own use
or for the use of the public, subject to such general rules and
regulations as the Legislature may see proper to impose for1 8the
protection of the rights of the public, whatever those may be.' 3
The Court then went on to recognize the wharfage rights in question
to exist in the party claiming as a riparian owner.
Since the District of Columbia was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, the Supreme Court in the Potomac Steam
Boat case was free to apply any rule relating to riparian rights that
it thought best. It chose to adopt the majority position taken by the
states and gave full recognition to both access and wharfage subject
only to the power of Congress to regulate commerce. This position
has since been adopted in the lower federal courts of the District of
Columbia and is now the settled law of the district. 3 9
The Ninth Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Territory of Alaska, through a series of cases, have adopted the same
position as that taken in the District of Columbia on the nature and
extent of access and wharfage rights over submerged lands of territorial navigable waters. As stated by the United States District Court
for Alaska in Ketchikan Spruce Mills v. Alaska Concrete Products Co.:
"It is well established that a right of access. . .is a property right and
-108 U.S. 672 (1884).
'Id. at 682.
'nUnited States v. Belt, 142 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Martin v. Standard Oil of
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may be exercised by constructing a wharf, pier or dock over the intervening tide lands to the navigable waters."' 4
The positions taken by the courts in the District of Columbia and
Alaska clearly show recognition of the riparians' wharfage and dockage
rights over the lands held by the United States in fee. Although the
fee title held by the United States in the beds of Flathead Lake is in
trust for the Indians, just as the bed of navigable waters within Alaska
were held in trust for the future state, the United States does have
plenary power over Indian lands and the same rationales should be
applicable to delineate the rights held by the riparian grantees on the
lake: (1) The United States has, except in limited cases consistently
taken the position that rights of riparian on navigable waters should
be determined by state law, 14 ' and Montana law would recognize access
and wharfage rights; (2) unless the United States were to adopt a
stand completely contra to its present position, the United States could
not allow the Indians to interfere with the eitercise of riparian rights
without making compensation therefor; (3) wharfage and access by
the riparian owners would in no way interfere with the fishing rights
of the tribes in the lake; and (4) the whole tenor of the legislation
and administrative activity under which the unallotted lands were sold
indicated that the government expected the grantees to exercise riparian rights.
CONCLUSION
The riparian owners on Flathead Lake possess full access and wharfage rights which cannot be destroyed or infringed upon without compensation. This conclusion is based upon either of two alternate approaches. (1) The United States as trustee for the confederated tribes
has no interest in the lands below high water mark because either the
lands were never held in trust for the Indians, or because any title
which the United States did undertake to hold was extinguished upon
the allotment and sale of the reservation lands and by implication
passed to the State of Montana and ultimately to the riparian owners.
(2) Even if the title to the lake bed is still held in trust for the confederated tribes, the United States would recognize the rights of the
riparian owners to access and wharfage.
,SAM E. HADDON

New Jersey, 198 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Groen, 72 F.Supp. 713
(D.D.C. 1947).
1'113 F.Supp. 700 (D. Alaska 1953). For earlier eases developing this rule see Decker
v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 164 Fed. 974 (9th Cir. 1908); Columbia Canning Co. v.
Hampton, 161 Fed. 60 (9th. Cir. 1909); Dalton v. Hazelet, 182 Fed. 561 (9th Cir.
1910); Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 229 Fed. 966 (9th
Cir. 1916).
"See Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 25.
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